Source trail

Source index

원문·공식자료·보도·가설 생성 출처를 구분합니다.

Source Index

Last updated: 2026-05-04

Methodology / OSINT standards

SourceURLTypeNotes
Bellingcat Online Investigation Toolkithttps://bellingcat.gitbook.io/toolkitOSINT toolkitTool categories: maps/satellites, geolocation, image/video, social media, websites, companies/finance
Bellingcat Guides & Handbookshttps://bellingcat.gitbook.io/toolkit/resources/guides-and-handbooksGuide indexLinks to Verification Handbook, GIJN resources, Berkeley Protocol, OSINT at Home
CISA Election Disinformation Toolkithttps://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/election-disinformation-toolkitUS official / archivedElection disinformation context and trusted-source framing

AWEB / USAID starter sources

SourceURLTypeInitial relevance
A-WEB Abouthttps://www.aweb.org/eng/main/contents.do?menuNo=300002Primary / officialA-WEB self-description, membership count, organizational profile
A-WEB Secretary Generalhttps://www.aweb.org/eng/main/contents.do?menuNo=300096Primary / officialLeadership/secretariat context
A-WEB news: MOUs with international development agencies incl. USAIDhttps://www.aweb.org/eng/bbs/B0000013/view.do?nttId=58&menuNo=300039&gubun=1Primary / official A-WEB pageCaptured 2026-05-01; recaptured 2026-05-02. Page text states A-WEB concluded MOUs with USAID/IFES/DI/NDI/IRI in Washington D.C. (Apr 28–May 1, 2014), last-updated stamp 2014-05-02. 2026-05-02 recapture confirms named USAID counterpart (Acting Director Scott Dobberstein, DRG Center) and cooperation scopes (EMB capacity building, legal-environment support, research/info exchange). USAID-side mirror still needed.
A-WEB International Cooperation page (partners strip includes direct USAID link/logo)https://www.aweb.org/eng/article/contents.do?menuNo=300031Primary / official A-WEB page2026-05-03 18:40 KST recapture via raw HTML confirms partner-list markup includes <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/" ... alt="USAID"> alongside other election stakeholders (e.g., IFES/NDI/IRI/International IDEA). This is primary evidence of A-WEB’s public partner-list association with USAID (confirmed for listing existence), but it does not by itself prove funding flow, program implementation, or election manipulation (confirmed-limited).
A-WEB press release on election-rigging allegations (nttId=16438)https://aweb.org/eng/bbs/B0000013/view.do?nttId=16438&gubun=3&menuNo=300043Primary / official A-WEB page (press release)Captured 2026-05-02. A-WEB denial/defense text explicitly claims: (a) only 8 ODA partner countries incl. Kyrgyz/DR Congo, (b) no post-MOU exchanges/activities with USAID after 2014 MOU. Treat as a claim-source to verify against independent records, not a conclusion. Attachment PDF link exposed: /eng/cmm/fms/FileDown.do?atchFileId=FILE_000000000012077&fileSn=2&bbsId=B0000013. 2026-05-02 17:20 KST: attachment full-text extraction(9p) confirmed the same claims and provided a country-by-country ODA equipment table (e.g., DR Congo: 데이터센터 1식; Kyrgyz: PCOS 710 + election IS + data center) while Iraq is not listed among the 8 ODA countries.
A-WEB Membership / Join Ushttps://www.aweb.org/eng/main/contents.do?menuNo=300038Primary / officialMentions partner/MOU mechanism
USAID Global Network for Securing Electoral Integrityhttps://usaid.gov/democracy/global-network-securing-electoral-integrityPrimary / officialUSAID election integrity program context
USAID Supporting Free and Fair Elections archivehttps://2017-2020.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/supporting-free-and-fair-electionsPrimary / official archiveUSAID election support mechanisms
USAID Political Party Assistance policyhttps://usaid.gov/policy/political-party-assistancePrimary / officialGovernance/election-related policy boundary context
USAID technical assistance election PDF leadhttps://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacf794.pdfPrimary / USAID PDFNeeds identification and relevance check

Overseas election-integrity / country-comparison leads

SourceURLTypeInitial relevance
The Sentry: Electronic Voting Technology DRChttps://thesentry.org/reports/electronic-voting-technology-drc/NGO technical/investigative reportDR Congo 2018 Miru electronic-voting technology security/transparency concerns; useful for vulnerability context, not direct A-WEB manipulation proof
BBC Reality Check: DR Congo elections: Why do voters mistrust electronic voting?https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46555444Secondary / mainstream mediaDR Congo electronic voting mistrust, opposition concerns, US UN warning, election logistics context
France24/AFP: S. Korea distances itself from firm assisting DR Congo votehttps://www.france24.com/en/20180403-korea-distances-itself-firm-assisting-dr-congo-voteSecondary / wire reportSouth Korean government statement distancing itself from Miru Systems DRC contract
Enough Project: Corporate Responsibility in DR Congo’s Electoral Processhttps://enoughproject.org/blog/enough-project-encourages-corporate-responsibility-dr-congos-electoral-processNGO / advocacyMentions reports that Miru's entrance into Congo was partly facilitated by A-WEB; needs primary corroboration
OECD NCP instance: MiruSystems and Samy Badibanga Ntitahttps://mneguidelines.oecd.org/database/instances/ke0019.htmPrimary / official (OECD NCP database)Documents a formal 2018 complaint alleging Miru voting-machine risks/corruption concerns in DRC; Korean NCP final statement says the case was not accepted on applicability grounds (not a merits ruling on fraud).
CENI official-domain Miru contract page lead (search-index capture)http://www.ceni.cd/decisions/2022/08/16/signature-du-contrat-entre-la-ceni-et-miru-systems-co ; local note: sources/2026-05-04-ceni-miru-search-lead.mdOfficial-domain lead / search-index snippet2026-05-04 Brave result exposes apparent CENI page title/snippet for CENI–MIRU SYSTEMS Co contract and ARMP decision 23/22/ARMP/CRD; direct origin DNS and archive fetch currently unavailable, so treat as confirmed-limited lead, not captured primary text.
MediaCongo full-text corroboration (CENI–MIRU + ARMP identifier)https://www.mediacongo.net/article-actualite-109312_revision_du_fichier_electoral_la_ceni_et_miru_systems_co_signent_un_accord_pour_l_acquisition_des_kits_electoraux.html ; local note: sources/2026-05-04-mediacongo-ceni-miru-corroboration.mdSecondary / domestic media (DRC)2026-05-04 web_fetch full-text capture confirms article body details CENI↔MIRU contract signature, Smartmatic challenge context, and ARMP decision identifier N°23/22/ARMP/CRD (plus named ARMP interim DG). This materially strengthens cross-outlet corroboration for procurement/vender timeline (likely) but remains secondary evidence; does not prove A-WEB involvement or manipulation.
One Korea Network: NEC and A-WEB involved in rigging elections overseashttps://onekoreanetwork.com/2020/10/21/a-shocking-fact-national-election-commission-and-a-web-involved-in-rigging-elections-overseas/Allegation source / opinion-investigationGenerates country-lead list (Iraq, Congo, Kyrgyzstan, etc.); low reliability for conclusions without independent sources
A-WEB Country Program: Kyrgyz Republichttps://aweb.org/eng/article/contents.do?menuNo=300026Primary / official A-WEBFull page captured (2026-05-01): A-WEB states Kyrgyz capacity-building project was conducted with KOICA, SDC, Korea NEC, and Kyrgyz CEC/government; PCOS distributed nationwide after pilot; central server/statistics upgrades for Oct 2015 parliamentary elections. Self-report, so effects/causality need independent validation.
A-WEB Country Program country pages (menuNo scan)https://aweb.org/eng/article/contents.do?menuNo=300026 ; https://aweb.org/eng/article/contents.do?menuNo=300027 ; https://aweb.org/eng/article/contents.do?menuNo=300028 ; https://aweb.org/eng/article/contents.do?menuNo=300029 ; https://aweb.org/eng/article/contents.do?menuNo=300030Primary / official A-WEB2026-05-02 scan confirms visible country pages are Kyrgyz/Ecuador/El Salvador/Fiji/Uzbekistan (5). This is important for checking consistency against A-WEB press-release claim (nttId=16438) that ODA partner countries were 8 (incl. DR Congo/Samoa/PNG). Treat as an internal-consistency lead, not final contradiction verdict.
A-WEB Membership pages (By Continents / By Alphabet)https://aweb.org/eng/bbs/B0000019/listAll.do?option=africa&menuNo=300036 ; https://www.aweb.org/eng/bbs/B0000019/listAll.do?showFlag=a&menuNo=300037Primary / official A-WEB2026-05-01 capture confirms A-WEB membership list includes Independent National Electoral Commission of DR Congo (CENI), Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq, and Central Commission for Elections and Referenda of Kyrgyzstan. This documents institutional membership, not manipulation evidence.
A-WEB Membership individual pages (DR Congo/Iraq/Kyrgyzstan)https://www.aweb.org/eng/bbs/B0000019/view.do?nttId=3030&menuNo=300037 ; https://www.aweb.org/eng/bbs/B0000019/view.do?nttId=3077&menuNo=300037 ; https://www.aweb.org/eng/bbs/B0000019/view.do?nttId=3080&menuNo=300037Primary / official A-WEB2026-05-01 capture confirms entity-level membership pages for CENI (DR Congo), IHEC (Iraq), and CEC (Kyrgyzstan), each showing Join: 2013 plus EMB profile snippets. Supports institutional-network facts; does not itself prove vendor involvement, procedural abuse, or manipulation execution.
A-WEB webinar materials page + direct attachment endpoint (DR Congo CENI)https://www.aweb.org/eng/bbs/B0000028/view.do?nttId=13978&menuNo=300089&gubun=3 ; https://www.aweb.org/eng/cmm/fms/FileDown.do?atchFileId=FILE_000000000010654&fileSn=2&bbsId=B0000028Primary / official A-WEB (+ direct file endpoint)2026-05-02 recheck: page text confirms 2021-06-30 Elections & Technology webinar material by DR Congo CENI; curl -I confirms direct downloadable PDF endpoint (filename How to Incorporate New Systems into Our Electoral Processes(DR Congo CENI).pdf, 2,519,559 bytes, HTTP 200). 2026-05-02 17:06 KST: local PDF text extraction (pypdf, empty-password decrypt) confirms slide title + speaker Corneille NANGAA YOBELUO, Chairperson of CENI-RDC and agenda items including La machine à voter and Avenir des TIC aux élections. This is stronger evidence of documented technical exchange content, not evidence of manipulation.
OSCE/ODIHR Final Report: Kyrgyzstan Parliamentary Elections (4 Oct 2020)https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/elections/kyrgyzstan/472461Primary / official international observer report2026-05-01 extraction confirmed report text: contesting parties alleged large-scale vote-buying/pressure; protests escalated on 5 Oct; on 6 Oct CEC invalidated voting results. Supports procedural-controversy timeline without proving manipulation execution.
Kyrgyz CEC news: “ЦИК признала недействительными итоги голосования на выборах”https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/news/3702/Primary / official (mirror-captured full text from official page)2026-05-03 capture via https://r.jina.ai/http://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/news/3702/ confirms official CEC news body dated 06 октября 2020 explicitly states that on 2020-10-06 the CEC recognized as invalid the voting results of the 2020-10-04 parliamentary election. This upgrades the item from URL lead to primary-text confirmed (confirmed) for procedural-controversy timeline evidence; it does not by itself prove manipulation execution.
Kyrgyz CEC Resolution No.249 (invalidating vote results)https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/npacik/Postanovleniya_CIK_KR-BShKnyn_toktomdoru/o-priznanii-nedejstvi/Primary / official (mirror-captured full text)2026-05-02 cycle: full text captured via https://r.jina.ai/http://shailoo.gov.kg/.../o-priznanii-nedejstvi/ with operative clause Признать недействительными итоги голосования..., signatories, and date/place (г. Бишкек, 6 октября 2020 года № 249). Direct fetch to origin remains unstable in this environment, so preserve mirror-capture provenance.
Kyrgyz CEC official 2021 election information page explicitly citing Resolution #249https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/news/6079/Primary / official (Kyrgyz CEC news/info page)2026-05-03 capture via r.jina.ai confirms the official text states that, due to the socio-political situation and to prevent escalation, the 2020-10-04 parliamentary-vote results were recognized invalid under CEC Resolution № 249 (2020-10-06). This is a primary cross-reference that strengthens procedural-controversy timeline evidence (confirmed) but does not by itself prove manipulation execution.
7SUR7.CD: CENI–Miru contract signing report with ARMP decision citationhttps://7sur7.cd/2022/08/19/elections-2023-la-ceni-et-lentreprise-miru-systems-signent-un-contrat-pour-lacquisitionSecondary / domestic media (DRC)2026-05-02 full-text capture confirms article text citing ARMP dispute-committee decision n°23/22/ARMP/CRD/ du 15 août 2022 and noting Smartmatic appeal before final award to Miru. Useful as stronger lead toward the missing primary ARMP decision document.
ACP Congo Miru 기사 URL 상태 점검(소스 부패/재활용 도메인 확인)https://acpcongo.com/index.php/2022/08/19/ceni-signature-du-contrat-dacquisition-des-kits-denrolement-avec-miru-systems-co/Source-health / secondary lead QA2026-05-02 22:33 KST 점검에서 대상 URL이 원기사 대신 범용 라이프스타일/광고형 메인 페이지(Acp Congo)로 리다이렉트됨을 확인(기사 본문 미복구). Wayback availablearchived_snapshots: {}로 반환되어 본 환경에서는 과거 본문 복구 경로가 없음. 의미: 기존 2차 인용 링크 중 일부가 현재 재현 불가하므로, 동일 주장 검증은 7sur7/공식문서 축으로 재가중 필요.
ARMP RDC official CRD decisions archive (15-page index)https://armp-rdc.cd/category/publication-2/recours-et-contentieux-decisions-du-crd/recours-et-contentieux-decisions-du-crd-publication-2/ ; https://armp-rdc.cd/category/publication-2/recours-et-contentieux-decisions-du-crd/recours-et-contentieux-decisions-du-crd-publication-2/page/15/Primary / official (ARMP RDC)2026-05-02~2026-05-03 recapture confirms ARMP official category index for Décisions du CRD is accessible and paginated to page 15. Current visible window includes numbered CRD decisions (e.g., 2026/2025/2024/2023 and 33/22 on page 15), but a page-by-page scan of the 15-page archive still does not surface target 23/22/ARMP/CRD. This is a stronger official-corpus negative result (confirmed-limited) and keeps 23/22 as an unresolved primary-document gap.
ARMP decision page N°33/22/ARMP/CRD (adjacent-case primary check)https://armp-rdc.cd/decision-n33-22-armp-crd-du-16-decembre-2022/Primary / official (ARMP RDC decision post)2026-05-03 direct fetch confirms the ARMP decision post exists and concerns a dispute by AGRIC-TECH over CNSSAP provincial-agency construction lots (Mbujimayi/Mbandaka/Kisangani), with downloadable attachment label for that decision. 2026-05-03 12:33 KST follow-up downloaded the linked attachment PDF (DECISION-N°33-22-ARMP-CRD-DU-16-DECEMBRE-2022.pdf, 11 pages, ~8.79MB) and extracted text (~28k chars); pattern scan found AGRIC-TECH mentions but no 23/22, Miru, Smartmatic, CENI, or SNCC strings in extracted text. This upgrades the adjacent-case check to full-attachment scope for this document (confirmed for bounded non-match within extracted text) while still not resolving the missing 23/22 primary document and not proving/ disproving election manipulation.
ARMP decision page N°23/23/ARMP/CRD (numbering-pattern anchor)https://armp-rdc.cd/decision-n23-23-armp-crd-du-31-juillet-2023/Primary / official (ARMP RDC decision post)2026-05-03 11:52 KST: ARMP 공식 wp-sitemap.xml의 하위 post-sitemap2.xml 전수 스캔에서 decision-n23-23-armp-crd slug를 직접 확인(confirmed). 2026-05-03 12:12 KST: 같은 URL의 본문 가시 텍스트를 직접 캡처해 N°23/23/ARMP/CRDSOCIETE MANAGEMENT PROFESSION DES MINING SARL (SMPM)의 입찰 탈락 이의(철도자재 공급 건) 분쟁 사건임을 확인했고, 가시 본문 범위에서 23/22, Miru, Smartmatic 직접 언급은 미검출(confirmed-limited). 2026-05-03 12:24 KST: 게시물에 연결된 원문 PDF(.../DECISION-N23-23-ARMP-CRD-31-JUILLET-2023.pdf, 약 3.6MB)를 직접 확보한 뒤 문자열 추출로 사건 당사자/사건명(SMPM, SOCIETE MANAGEMENT PROFESSION MINING, SNCC)이 재확인됐고, 같은 추출 범위에서 Miru/Smartmatic/23/22 패턴은 미검출(confirmed-limited). 의미: ARMP에서 n23-YY 형식 slug가 실제 운용됨을 재확인하면서도, 23/23 원문 첨부 기준으로도 현재 확보 범위는 Miru/선거기술 분쟁과 분리된 조달 이의 사건이다. 단, 이는 23/22 문서 부재를 단정하지 않으며(인덱스/본문/문자열 추출 가시 범위 한정), A-WEB 관여 또는 실제 조작 증거를 입증하지 않는다.
ARMP WordPress sitemap index + post sitemap set (post-sitemap.xml, post-sitemap2.xml)https://armp-rdc.cd/wp-sitemap.xml ; https://armp-rdc.cd/post-sitemap.xml ; https://armp-rdc.cd/post-sitemap2.xmlPrimary / official (ARMP RDC site infrastructure index)2026-05-03 11:30 KST check: official sitemap index lists exactly 8 sitemap files and only 2 post sitemaps (post-sitemap.xml, post-sitemap2.xml; no post-sitemap3+ in index). Full scan of both post sitemaps (1,956 URLs total) found no slug pattern matching decision-n23-22-armp-crd/23-22-armp-crd/n23-22, while 2022 CRD decision slugs visible in this sitemap scope were n04(2 URL variants) and n33. 2026-05-03 11:52 KST follow-up additionally confirmed decision-n23-23-armp-crd exists in post-sitemap2.xml, strengthening the numbering-pattern baseline while preserving the unresolved n23-22 gap. This remains materially stronger official negative evidence for current index scope (confirmed-limited) and narrows the next search path to non-indexed attachments, alternate repositories, or external legal citations.
Reuters: Iraq parliament ordered nationwide manual recount; electronic-count concerns and Miru contract contexthttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-election/iraqi-parliament-votes-for-manual-recount-of-may-election-results-idUSKCN1J2228/Secondary / mainstream wire2018-06-06 report: parliament ordered manual recount, suspended IHEC leadership, cited serious violations and concerns around electronic count devices (Miru contract noted).
Reuters: Iraq recount showed no major changes to seat outcomeshttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-election/recount-shows-iraqs-sadr-retains-election-victory-no-major-changes-idUSKBN1KV041/Secondary / mainstream wire2018-08-10 report: nationwide recount largely matched initial results (13/18 provinces) and did not significantly alter outcome, while preserving procedural-controversy context.
Iraq Federal Supreme Court page lead on 2018 manual-recount constitutionality (news.4127)https://www.iraqfsc.iq/news.4127/Primary / official (URL lead; body capture pending)2026-05-02 search found an official-court URL dated 2018-06-26 with snippet indicating the court deemed manual recount/judge substitution measures constitutionally compatible. Direct fetch currently blocked by Cloudflare challenge, so treat as verification-pending primary lead.
Iraq IHEC official web domain + WP API corpus (alternative official corpus)https://ihec.iq/ ; https://ihec.iq/decisions/ ; https://ihec.iq/results/ ; https://ihec.iq/wp-json/wp/v2/categories?search=%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%20%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%8A%D9%86 ; https://ihec.iq/wp-json/wp/v2/posts?categories=69&after=2018-01-01T00:00:00&before=2022-01-01T00:00:00Primary / official (Iraq election commission site)2026-05-02 23:55 KST capture confirmed ihec.iq is reachable with structured sections (قرارات مجلس المفوضين, نتائج الانتخابات). 2026-05-03 00:18 KST recapture further confirmed that individual decision posts are directly reachable (e.g., https://ihec.iq/41269/2025/11/, .../41495/2025/11/, .../41786/2025/11/) and each exposes a direct attachment-style image URL under wp-content/uploads (e.g., https://ihec.iq/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/35-45-100.jpg). 2026-05-03 00:36 KST: WP REST category search identifies قرارات مجلس المفوضين as category 69 (count=1692), and an official API date-window query for 2018-01-01 through 2021-12-31 returns 354 decision posts. Searches within that official post corpus for recount/manual-count Arabic terms (العد, الفرز, اليدوي, اليدوية, اعادة العد, اعاده العد) returned 0 hits in the WP API searchable text/title fields, so the 2018 recount issue likely requires attachment OCR, result pages, court pages, or non-decision sections. 2026-05-03 00:39 KST: year-distribution check on the same API window shows all 354 posts are dated in 2021 only (2021:354, 2018/2019/2020:0, min 2021-02-09, max 2021-12-20), with wp-content/uploads links present in 338 posts; recount-related Arabic keywords were still 0 in searchable title/content and extracted attachment filenames. This indicates a likely archive/index coverage gap for 2018-2020 within this category path. This is official-corpus/source-access evidence, not manipulation proof. 2026-05-03 00:56 KST: category list recheck expanded the official IHEC path beyond decision category 69; category 68 (اخبار المكتب الوطني) has 388 posts in the 2018-2021 window and keyword searches found recount/manual-count terms (العد 55, الفرز 33, اليدوي 29, إعادة العد 9). Sample official posts include https://ihec.iq/16282/2021/11/ and https://ihec.iq/16275/2021/11/, which explicitly mention إعادة عد وفرز / إعادة العد والفرز اليدوي for challenged polling stations in 2021. This confirms a productive official source path for Iraq recount-procedure documents, but does not by itself establish 2018 facts, A-WEB/vendor involvement, or manipulation evidence. 2026-05-03 01:03 KST follow-up: refining category 68 by year found 2020:10, 2021:378 (total 388). In 2020 posts, recount-specific terms (الفرز, اليدوي, إعادة العد) were 0; the single العد hit came from a generic fairness term (العدالة) in post 4658, not recount procedure. This strengthens a narrow inference that the currently reachable official recount-procedure signals in this category are concentrated in 2021 within API-searchable text. 2026-05-03 01:25 KST: additional extraction found official post https://ihec.iq/16260/2021/11/ (كسب الدعوى المرقمة (144 / اتحادية /2021)) containing a direct iraqfsc.iq decision-PDF link (/krarat/1/2021/144_fed_2021.pdf). The target file remains Cloudflare-blocked from this environment (403), but this is a confirmed official cross-link path between IHEC and Federal Supreme Court decision records. 2026-05-03 01:43 KST: category 68/69 link scan using the official WP API found, within the successfully fetched subset, category 68 pages 1-2 had 200 posts and exactly one unique iraqfsc.iq link (the same 144_fed_2021.pdf from post 16260); category 69 had 354 posts and 0 iraqfsc.iq links. 2026-05-03 01:46 KST follow-up completed the previously timed-out extraction for category 68 pages 1-8 (all 388 posts): only post 16260 contained iraqfsc.iq links (same URL duplicated), leaving one unique Federal Supreme Court PDF link in the full category-68 window and no direct news.4127 link observed in this API content/link scope.
Iraq IHEC 공식 성명(2023-12-17): 법률(2018법 개정) 조항·미전송 결과 처리·Miru 언급https://ihec.iq/29135/2023/12/Primary / official (IHEC statement)2026-05-03 09:27 KST: r.jina.ai/http://ihec.iq/29135/2023/12/ 전체 본문 캡처. 성명은 2023년 개정선거법(2018법 개정) 조항을 인용해 “결과전송장치로 6시간 내 전송 실패 시 중앙감사센터에서 수개표 결과를 채택” 절차를 명시하고, 일부 특수투표소 미전송 사유를 “기기 제조사(شركة ميرو الكورية, Miru Korean company) 2023-12-17자 서한”으로 설명. 또한 위원회 결의(예외회의 67, 결정 1호)로 해당 투표소 이관·수개표·양식(41/42) 처리 절차를 공지. 의미: Iraq 축에서 ‘한국 벤더(미루) 언급 + 절차적 취약성/대응(수개표)’이 공식 1차 문서로 확인됨(confirmed). 단, 이는 2023 사례의 절차·기술 이슈 문서이며 A-WEB 관여나 실제 조작 증거를 직접 입증하지 않음.
Iraq IHEC 공지(2025-03-13): Miru 경영진 면담 및 기존 전자개표 장비 계약 재언급https://ihec.iq/33850/2025/03/Primary / official (IHEC news post)2026-05-03 17:09 KST: 공식 원문 및 r.jina.ai 미러 본문을 함께 캡처해, IHEC가 Miru 대표단을 만나 2025 총선 준비·전자장비 업데이트·양측 계약 절차를 논의했다는 점과 “과거 Miru와 전자 분류·개표 장비 계약을 체결했으며 수개표를 대체/축소하는 취지” 문구를 확인(confirmed). 의미: Iraq 축의 벤더/기술 관여(공식 계약·운영 협력) 증거를 보강하지만, A-WEB 관여·선거무결성 논란·실제 조작 실행 증거를 직접 입증하지는 않음(confirmed-limited for manipulation claims).
Iraq IHEC المناقصات والعقود(입찰/계약) 2021 계약표 PDFhttps://ihec.iq/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%AF/ ; https://ihec.iq/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-2021.pdfPrimary / official (IHEC tenders/contracts page + attachment PDF)2026-05-03 20:23 KST: 공식 المناقصات والعقود 페이지에서 Download File 링크를 통해 2021 계약표 PDF(sha256 3925a3dbeeb3...7395e67f)를 직접 확보. .venv pypdf 추출 텍스트에서 الشركة الكورية Miru systems가 2회 노출되고, 계약 설명에 اجهزة التحقق الالكترونية والفرز والعد الالكترونيتسريع اعلان النتائج 문구가 확인됨(confirmed). 의미: Iraq 축에서 벤더/기술 관여(공식 계약 문서) 시계열을 2021까지 확장하는 1차 근거이며, A-WEB 관여·실제 조작 실행 증거를 직접 입증하지는 않음(confirmed-limited for manipulation claims).
Iraq IHEC 공지(2021-06-03): 선거장비 검사회사(Hensoldt) 평가위원회 회의https://ihec.iq/9163/2021/06/Primary / official (IHEC news post)2026-05-03 20:37 KST: 공식 원문 본문에서 آلية عمل اجهزة العد والفرز وتسريع النتائج, آلية عمل نقل البيانات, اوليات التعاقد مع الشركة الفاحصة (Hensoldt) 문구를 직접 확인. 또한 평가위원회가 선거법(2020년 제9호) 38조 및 위원회 결정(정기회의 28, 결정 7호)·행정명령(622/2021, 1695/2021) 근거로 운영되며, 계획/고등교육/통신/국가정보기관 및 쿠르드 지역 대표가 참여했다고 명시(confirmed). 의미: Iraq 축에서 벤더/기술 관여와 절차적 검증 거버넌스(장비검사·데이터전송 점검) 1차 근거를 보강하지만, A-WEB 관여·실제 조작 실행 증거를 직접 입증하지는 않음(confirmed-limited for manipulation claims).
Iraq IHEC Weekly Statement (2021-06-13): HENSOLDT 1차 평가보고 “오류 미발견” 문구https://ihec.iq/9451/2021/06/Primary / official (IHEC weekly statement, English)2026-05-03 20:44 KST: IHEC 공식 영문 Weekly Statement 본문에서 독일 검사회사 HENSOLDT Sensors GmbH가 1차 평가보고를 BoC에 제출했고, “first evaluation period 동안 선거시스템 장비의 technology/hardware/software에서 선거 시행을 방해할 오류를 발견하지 못했다(단, 제조사 운용지침 준수 조건)”는 서술을 직접 확인(confirmed). 의미: Iraq 축에서 검사회사의 방어/안정성 진술에 대한 1차 근거를 추가 보강하지만, 이는 A-WEB 관여·후속 절차 논란·실제 조작 실행 여부를 단독으로 입증/반박하지 않음(confirmed-limited).
Iraq IHEC Weekly Statement (59) (2021-06-06): Miru·Hensoldt·UNAMI/IFES 동시 참관 시뮬레이션 및 법적 근거(선거법 38조 3항)https://ihec.iq/9198/2021/06/Primary / official (IHEC weekly statement, English)2026-05-03 20:55 KST: IHEC 공식 영문 Weekly Statement (59) 본문에서 (a) 2021년 7월 예정 시뮬레이션을 Korean company “Miro” 협력 + 독일 검사회사 감독 + UNAMI/IFES 참관 구도로 설명하고, (b) 선거법 2020년 제9호 38조 3항에 따라 기술유관 정부기관 합동위원회가 검사회사(Hensoldt) 업무를 점검한다는 절차 문구를 확인(confirmed). 의미: Iraq 축에서 벤더/검사회사/국제참관/절차 거버넌스가 한 문서에 동시 명시된 1차 근거를 보강하지만, A-WEB 관여나 실제 조작 실행 증거를 직접 입증하지 않음(confirmed-limited for manipulation claims).
Iraq IHEC Weekly Statement (2022-02-28): MIRU에 선거장비(VVD/PCOS/VSAT) 테스트·운송·유지보수 프로그램 준비 지시https://ihec.iq/16977/2022/02/ ; https://ihec.iq/wp-json/wp/v2/posts/16977Primary / official (IHEC weekly statement + WP API record, English)2026-05-03 21:06 KST: IHEC 공식 주간성명 본문에서 위원회가 선거 전자장비 보존을 위해 기술지원위원회를 구성했고, 해당 위원회가 VVDs, PCOS, VSAT의 testing/shipping/maintenance를 담당하며 IHEC가 MIRU company에 관련 프로그램·기술 준비를 요청했다는 문구를 확인(confirmed). 같은 문서에서 IFES 협력 워크숍(유권자명부/장비 재활성화·프로그래밍/선거보안 등) 언급도 확인됨(confirmed). 의미: Iraq 축에서 벤더(MIRU) 관여가 ‘개표장비 공급’을 넘어 ‘사후 운용·유지보수 체계’까지 이어졌다는 1차 근거를 보강하나, A-WEB 관여·실제 조작 실행 증거를 직접 입증하지 않음(confirmed-limited for manipulation claims).
Iraq IHEC 정기회의(28) 결정문 노출 패턴 점검(결정 1·3·4·5·6 확인, 결정 7 미노출)https://ihec.iq/11283/2021/08/ ; https://ihec.iq/11290/2021/08/ ; https://ihec.iq/11297/2021/08/ ; https://ihec.iq/11304/2021/08/ ; https://ihec.iq/11310/2021/08/ ; https://ihec.iq/wp-json/wp/v2/posts/11283 ; https://ihec.iq/wp-json/wp/v2/posts/11290 ; https://ihec.iq/wp-json/wp/v2/posts/11297 ; https://ihec.iq/wp-json/wp/v2/posts/11304 ; https://ihec.iq/wp-json/wp/v2/posts/11310Primary / official (IHEC decision posts + WP API records)2026-05-03 21:52 KST: category 69의 2021년 전체(354건)를 날짜 오름차순 전수 점검한 결과, المحضر الاعتيادي (28)에 해당하는 게시물은 결정 번호 1, 3, 4, 5, 6으로 확인됐고(모두 2021-08-15 게시), 같은 범위에서 رقم (7) للمحضر الاعتيادي (28) 제목 게시물은 확인되지 않음(confirmed for visible-post pattern). 2021년 동년 범위에는 다른 회차의 قرار رقم (7) 게시물들이 다수 존재해(예: 회차 5/6/15/25/26/35/37/38/39/56/57/58/59/60), 단순 검색 인덱스 부재가 아니라 특정 회차-결정 조합의 미노출 가능성이 제기됨(confirmed-limited). 해석: 이는 문서 접근성/아카이브 공백 또는 비공개 가능성에 대한 기술적 단서이며, A-WEB 관여·벤더 개입 위법성·실제 조작 실행을 직접 입증하지 않음.
Iraq IHEC 예외회의(68) 결정문 1~3호 게시물 + 원본 첨부 이미지 경로https://ihec.iq/29138/2023/12/ ; https://ihec.iq/29162/2023/12/ ; https://ihec.iq/29169/2023/12/ ; https://ihec.iq/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/1-68.jpg ; https://ihec.iq/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2-68.jpg ; https://ihec.iq/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/3-68.jpgPrimary / official (IHEC decisions posts)2026-05-03 09:48 KST: IHEC WP REST API를 2023-12-16~18 창으로 조회해 4개 post를 확인(29135, 29138, 29162, 29169). 이 중 3개는 제목에 نـــــــص قـــــرار ... رقم (1/2/3) للمحضر الاستثنائي (68) 17/12/2023가 명시되고, 각 post 본문에서 원본 첨부 이미지(1-68.jpg, 2-68.jpg, 3-68.jpg) 링크가 노출됨을 확인(confirmed). 의미: 직전 29135가 참조한 동일 날짜의 위원회 결정문(68차 예외회의) 1차 경로를 확보. 단, 현재 단계는 문서 경로/존재 확인이며, A-WEB 관여·실제 조작 증거를 직접 입증하지 않음.
Wayback availability check — USAID Iraq IPEA archive pagehttps://archive.org/wayback/available?url=https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/iraq/fact-sheets/iraq-provincial-elections-activity-ipeaPrimary-metadata / official archive index2026-05-01 check returned closest snapshot 20250215115440 (web.archive.org/.../iraq-provincial-elections-activity-ipea). Snapshot body fetch from this environment still times out; treat as strong existence lead, not full-content capture.
Wayback availability check — USAID DRC archive leadshttps://archive.org/wayback/available?url=https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/democracy-human-rights-and-governance ; https://archive.org/wayback/available?url=https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/usaiddrc-cdcs-development-objective-onePrimary-metadata / official archive index2026-05-01 check returned empty archived_snapshots for both tested DRC URLs. Supports current blocker assessment (primary capture gap), not a substantive election finding.
Wayback availability check — USAID DRC election-observation press-release URL (2022-07-06 slug)https://archive.org/wayback/available?url=https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jul-06-2022-united-states-provides-additional-assistance-election-observation-democratic-republic-congoPrimary-metadata / official archive index2026-05-01 check returned closest snapshot (20250201071209, status 200) at web.archive.org. Snapshot body capture from current environment still failed, so this remains a strong document-existence lead (likely) pending full-text capture.
Wayback availability check — Kyrgyz CEC invalidation URLshttps://archive.org/wayback/available?url=https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/news/3702/ ; https://archive.org/wayback/available?url=https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/npacik/Postanovleniya_CIK_KR-BShKnyn_toktomdoru/o-priznanii-nedejstvi/Primary-metadata / official archive index2026-05-02 recheck: news/3702 still no snapshot in this run, while Resolution #249 URL returns closest snapshot (20260321213011, status 200). Since full text was independently mirror-captured in this cycle, Wayback now serves as backup provenance rather than sole existence lead for Resolution #249.

TODO