Verified Timeline
Only add events with source links. Mark uncertain dates clearly.
| Date | Event | Source | Confidence | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013-10-14 | A-WEB reportedly established in Songdo, South Korea. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_of_World_Election_Bodies (secondary lead; needs primary confirmation) | uncertain | Need A-WEB founding document / official source. |
| 2014-04-28~2014-05-01 | A-WEB official news states it concluded MOUs in Washington D.C. with USAID, IFES, DI, NDI, and IRI. | https://www.aweb.org/eng/bbs/B0000013/view.do?nttId=58&menuNo=300039&gubun=1 | likely | Primary A-WEB-side statement captured (2026-05-01). USAID-side confirmation and original MOU text still needed. |
| 2018-07-19 | Former DRC Prime Minister Samy Badibanga filed an OECD NCP specific instance against Miru Systems regarding voting-machine human-rights/corruption concerns. | https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/database/instances/ke0019.htm | confirmed | Official OECD NCP database entry confirms filing date and allegation framing. |
| 2018-10-12 | Korea NCP final statement marked the Miru specific instance as “Not accepted,” citing OECD Guidelines applicability scope to the company. | https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/database/instances/ke0019.htm | confirmed | This is a procedural/admissibility outcome, not a merits adjudication of election-fraud allegations. |
| 2015-10 (pre-election period) | A-WEB Kyrgyz Country Program page states PCOS deployment and central server/statistics-system upgrades were provided for the October 2015 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan. | https://aweb.org/eng/article/contents.do?menuNo=300026 | likely | Official A-WEB self-report confirms claimed support scope; impact claims need independent corroboration. |
| 2020-10-06 | OSCE/ODIHR 2020 final report states that after allegations of vote-buying/pressure and 5 Oct protests, Kyrgyz CEC invalidated voting results. | https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/elections/kyrgyzstan/472461 | confirmed | Confirmed as a documented procedural event in an official international observer final report (p.5 narrative). This does not by itself prove who, if anyone, manipulated votes. |
| 2020-10-06 | Kyrgyz CEC official-domain URL leads identify a news post and Resolution No.249 stating parliamentary-election vote results were invalidated. | https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/news/3702/ ; https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/npacik/Postanovleniya_CIK_KR-BShKnyn_toktomdoru/o-priznanii-nedejstvi/ | likely | Official-domain links and indexed summaries found, but direct page retrieval timed out in this environment; keep as verification-pending until full-text/archived capture. |
| 2026-05-01 | A-WEB official membership-page capture shows DR Congo CENI, Iraq IHEC, and Kyrgyz election commission listed as A-WEB members. | https://aweb.org/eng/bbs/B0000019/listAll.do?option=africa&menuNo=300036 ; https://www.aweb.org/eng/bbs/B0000019/listAll.do?showFlag=a&menuNo=300037 | confirmed | Confirms institutional membership listing on A-WEB website at capture time; does not by itself evidence election manipulation or vendor-level intervention. |
| 2018-06-06 | Reuters reported Iraq parliament ordered a nationwide manual recount after electronic-count irregularity allegations and suspended IHEC leadership. | https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-election/iraqi-parliament-votes-for-manual-recount-of-may-election-results-idUSKCN1J2228/ | likely | Strong secondary source; primary Iraqi legal/commission records still needed. |
| 2018-08-10 | Reuters reported Iraq’s nationwide recount did not significantly change overall election outcomes. | https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-election/recount-shows-iraqs-sadr-retains-election-victory-no-major-changes-idUSKBN1KV041/ | likely | Useful to separate procedural controversy from proven large-scale manipulation. |